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Abstract
Intertemporal substitution is at the heart of modern macroeconomics and finance as
well as economic policymaking, but a large fraction of a representative population
of men – those below the top of the distribution by cognitive abilities (IQ) – do
not change their consumption propensities with their inflation expectations. Low-
IQ men are also less than half as sensitive to interest-rate changes when making
borrowing decisions. Our microdata include unique administrative information on
cognitive abilities, as well as economic expectations, consumption and borrowing
plans, and total household debt from Finland. Heterogeneity in observables such as
education, income, other expectations, and financial constraints do not drive these
patterns. Costly information acquisition and the ability to form accurate forecasts
are channels that cannot fully explain these results. Limited cognitive abilities could
be human frictions in the transmission and effectiveness of fiscal and monetary
policies that operate through household consumption and borrowing decisions.
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I Introduction
In particular, low interest rates encourage households to bring forward durable consump-
tion, and firms’ investment, through credit.
Mario Draghi (2016)
The consumption Euler equation is at the heart of modern dynamic models in
macroeconomics and finance. Conventional monetary policy aims to stabilize the economy
by changing interest rates, and hence households’ consumption expenditure through
intertemporal substitution. Intertemporal substitution is also central to the effectiveness
of unconventional monetary policy and conventional or unconventional fiscal policies.1
Standard models and policies assume agents form their expectations rationally and react
to changes in expectations. Empirically, many policies that aim to manage households’
expectations and hence choice are not as effective as representative-agent models imply,
with forward guidance being a recent example (McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016)).2
In this paper, we argue that limited cognitive abilities are human frictions to the
effectiveness of policies that operate through household expectations. In a representative
sample of Finnish men for whom we observe administrative data on cognitive abilities
through IQ tests, only men with high cognitive abilities adjust their consumption
propensities in response to changes in inflation expectations.3 High-IQ men are also
twice as sensitive to changes in interest rates when making borrowing decisions compared
to low-IQ men, at times of both increases and decreases of policy rates. Differences in
income, education, borrowing constraints, or other expectations such as household income
expectations cannot explain the heterogeneity in consumption and borrowing responses
by IQ.
Men with low cognitive abilities are economically relevant because they represent
1See Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Farhi and Werning (2016), and Correia, Farhi, Nicolini, and
Teles (2013).
2Earlier research found conflicting results on whether households’ choice reacts to their inflation
expectations. For instance, see Bachmann et al. (2015), Crump et al. (2018), and D’Acunto, Hoang,
and Weber (2018a).
3In a companion paper (D’Acunto, Hoang, Paloviita, and Weber (2019)), we show the quality
and consistency of economic expectations and economic choices that high-cognitive-ability men form
is substantially higher than those of low-cognitive-ability men.
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more than 50% of the individuals and 50% of the income in our sample. Any non-response
to policy changes by these men might be material to explaining the limited effectiveness
of policy interventions implemented under the assumption that unconstrained households
react.
We base our analysis on administrative individual-level data from Finland. Around
age 20, Finnish men take a standardized test of cognitive abilities when entering the
mandatory military service. We observe the scores of all test takers between 1982 and
2001, which are provided as a standardized variable that follows a stanine distribution
(integers from 1 to 9, with 9 being the highest) to allow cross-cohort comparisons. We
match these test scores with the individual-level answers to the monthly harmonized
European Commission Consumer Survey (EU survey) from 2001 to 2015. This survey
elicits inflation expectations, propensities to consume and borrow, as well as a rich set
of demographics such as age, education, marital status, income, household size, and
employment status for a set of repeated representative cross sections of Finns. In addition,
we observe total debt outstanding at the household level from tax records.
We build on these unique data and on the fact that cognitive abilities are an
important determinant of macroeconomic expectations (see D’Acunto, Hoang, Paloviita,
and Weber (2019)) to assess the relationship between cognitive abilities and individuals’
responsiveness to economic policy. As a first step, we study whether individuals adjust
their consumption plans in line with the consumption Euler equation. The EU survey asks
how respondents think consumer prices will evolve in the following 12 months compared
to the previous 12 months.4
We split the sample into high-IQ (scores of 6 to 9) and low-IQ (scores of 5 and
below) respondents and find high-IQ respondents who think inflation will increase are
almost 4% more likely relative to other high-IQ men to state it is a good time to spend.
For low-IQ men, instead, we detect a negative and statistically insignificant association
between inflation expectations and their readiness to spend. These results hold conditional
on a rich set of demographics including education and income. Because low-IQ men do not
react in line with the consumption Euler equation and account for a significant fraction of
4For ease of interpretation, we follow D’Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2018a) and create a dummy
variable that equals 1 when a household expects inflation to increase.
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overall income, these results suggest cognitive abilities could be a first-order impediment
to the effectiveness of common fiscal and monetary policies that rely on intertemporal
substitution.
One might worry low-IQ men are more likely to be financially constrained than high-
IQ men, which would explain the insensitivity of their consumption plans to changes in real
interest rates (see Zeldes (1989)). Conditioning on household income does not affect any of
our baseline results, and low-income households are plausibly more likely to be financially
constrained than high-income households. We also confirm the baseline patterns when
running our analysis separately for men above the median of the distribution by income,
a subsample that includes both low- and high-IQ men.
Another potential concern is that expecting higher economic growth and hence higher
income might deliver a spurious positive relationship between the propensity to spend
and inflation expectations. We can rule out this concern directly, because we observe
individual income expectations elicited at the same time as inflation expectations. We
confirm our results when splitting the samples of high-IQ and low-IQ men into those men
reporting positive or negative income expectations. These results suggest a subjective
Phillips curve or indirect effects of monetary policy are unlikely to explain our findings
(Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018)).
After documenting that men with low cognitive abilities do not behave in line with
intertemporal substitution, we ask whether they react to changes in nominal interest
rates, which are a cornerstone of conventional monetary policy. Central banks commonly
lower nominal interest rates to stimulate consumption through household borrowing, and
increase rates to avoid overheating, as the introductory quote by European Central Bank
(ECB) President Draghi suggests. To tackle this question, we move on to test whether the
relationship between individuals’ propensity to borrow and changes in nominal interest
rates varies systematically with individuals’ cognitive abilities.5 An advantage of our
setting is our sample period includes two significant policy interventions on nominal
interest rates in opposite directions. The ECB, which has been responsible for the
monetary policy of Finland since 1999, lowered its policy rate substantially during and
5Note we do not argue that reacting to changes in nominal interest rates is optimal for all households.
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Figure 1: ECB Deposit Facility Rate and Propensity to Borrow by IQ
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This figure plots the beginning of the quarter European Central Bank Deposit Facility Rate (red-dashed line) from quarter 1
2001 to quarter 4 of 2006. The solid-blue lines are the cross-sectional mean of whether individuals think it is a good time to
take out a loan in Finland for high-IQ men in Panel A and for low-IQ men in Panel B. Individuals can answer that now is a
“very good time to borrow” (4), a “pretty good time to borrow” (3), a “pretty bad time to borrow” (2), or a “really bad time to
borrow” (1) to the question “If you think about the general economic situation in Finland, then do you think that at this time it
is ...” High-IQ men are all men with the highest 3 scores of the 9-bin IQ distribution. Low-IQ men are all men with the lowest
3 scores of the 9-bin distribution. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission Consumer
Survey to measure the propensity to take out a loan. IQ is the standardized test score from the Finnish Defence Forces. IQ
obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. The sample period is January 2001 to December 2006.
subsequent to the stockmarket turmoils of 2001. It kept rates low until 2005, and then
increased rates steeply up to January 2007.
Effective transmission of these monetary-policy interventions requires that households
increase their demand for loans when nominal rates drop, and decrease their demand for
loans when nominal rates increase, ceteris paribus. High-IQ men behave in line with
this predicted pattern, because their propensity to take out loans increases when rates
fall, stays constant while interest rates do not move, and lowers when interest rates rise.
To the contrary, low-IQ men appear to be less sensitive to changes in nominal interest
rates when forming their borrowing plans, irrespective of the direction of the rate change.
These results hold for the full sample as well if we limit the analysis to households that
are unlikely to be financially constrained.
A differential pass-through of policy rates to individual borrowing rates for low- and
high-IQ men might explain the differential borrowing sensitivities. A differential pass-
through is an unlikely explanation because 95% of all mortages in Finland are adjustable-
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rate mortgages with a spread on the 12-month EURIBOR, and mortgages represented
74% of all consumer debt at the end of 2014. Alternatively, low-IQ men might be shut-off
from financial markets, which is why they do not care about changes in interest rates.
Using registry data, we find individual leverage ratios that are almost constant across the
IQ distribution.
So far, we have exclusively studied the association between inflation expectations,
interest rates, and survey decisions. Even though low-IQ men might not adjust their
propensities to take out loans to changes in interest rates, it could still be the case high-
and low-IQ men might adjust their actual decisions in similar ways. Financial advisors,
for example, might call low-IQ men and tell them now is a good time to take out a loan
given interest rates are low. Using annual tax data, we find high-IQ men adjust their total
outstanding debt balances significantly more to changes in interest rates than low-IQ men.
In the last part of the paper, we study a set of (non-mutually exclusive) channels
that might explain our results to assess which interventions have a scope to counteract
limited cognitive abilities in the transmission of economic policies and inform economic
theory.
First, low-IQ men might be less informed about economic fundamentals like inflation
than high-IQ men. We label this potential channel the costly information-gathering
channel. The cognitive costs of gathering information about macroeconomic variables
might be high for low-IQ men, who might thus behave rationally by deciding to not
gather such information. We find that even the subset of low-IQ men that are correctly
informed about inflation does not adjust consumption plans in response to changing
inflation expectations.
The second channel we consider is that low-IQ men might have difficulties in thinking
in probabilistic terms about future states of the world (McDowell and Jacobs (2017)).
Under this costly expectations-formation channel, even well-informed low-IQ men might
have miscalibrated expectations about macroeconomic variables, which might in turn
explain their non-reaction to inflation expectations when forming consumption plans.
Even low-IQ men who have accurate inflation expectations do not react to inflation
expectations when forming consumption plans. This result suggests that the costly
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expectations-formation channel is unlikely to explain our results in full.
Because the tests for the first two channels do not provide us with a complete expla-
nation of our results, we discuss a potential third channel – the lack-of-economic-reasoning
channel. Even low-IQ men who have the relevant information about the current state of
the economy as well as accurate expectations might still not understand basic economic
concepts such as intertemporal substitution. This channel could also explain the excess
sensitivity of consumption to predictable income changes (see, e.g., Parker et al. (2013)).
The mechanism is consistent with Ilut and Valchev (2017), in which agents with limited
cognitive abilities cannot map future states into optimal actions. Similarly, low-IQ men
might not grasp the basic economic reasoning for why changing nominal interest rates
might affect their incentives to borrow over time.
Low-IQ men represent 50% of the overall income held in our sample, and hence
their inaction is material to the effective transmission of fiscal and monetary policy that
operates through household decisions. At the same time, our findings would have relevant
policy implications even if the fraction of income accruing to low-IQ men were smaller. In
fact, an important implication of our results is a potential redistributive role of monetary
policy. Because low-IQ men do not adjust their consumption plans in response to changes
in their inflation expectations and to changes in interest rates, common monetary-policy
interventions might result in redistribution from men with low cognitive abilities to men
with high cognitive abilities. To the extent that cognitive abilities are largely innate or
determined by environmental factors individuals can barely control in their early life,6
this redistribution might be interpreted as a form of unintended yet undue discrimination
of economic agents on the part of policymakers.
A. Related Literature
Our paper also relates to the large literature that emphasizes the stabilization role of
inflation expectations. On the monetary-policy side, Krugman et al. (1998), Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003), Eggertsson (2006), and Werning (2012) argue that a central bank
6For a review of the scholarly debate on the origins of cognitive abilities see, among others, Mc-Gue
et al. (1993) and Plomin and Spinath (2004).
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can stimulate current spending by committing to higher future inflation rates during
periods in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds. On the fiscal
policy side, Eggertsson (2011), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Woodford
(2011), and Farhi and Werning (2016) show that inflation expectations can increase fiscal
multipliers in standard New Keynesian models in times of a binding zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates. We add to this literature showing that cognitive abilities determine
whether individuals adjust their consumption plans in response to inflation expectations.
We also contribute to a recent literature that uses micro-level data to study
the relationship between inflation expectations and households’ readiness to purchase
consumption goods. Bachmann et al. (2015) start this literature using survey data
from the Michigan Survey of Consumers (MSC). They find an economically small and
statistically insignificant association between households’ inflation expectations and their
readiness to spend on durable consumption goods. Burke and Ozdagli (2014) confirm
these findings using panel survey data from the New York Fed/ RAND-American Life
Panel household expectations survey for a period from April 2009 to November 2012.
Ichiue and Nishiguchi (2015) find that Japanese households that expect higher inflation
plan to decrease their future consumption spending, but have increased their spending
in the past, whereas D’Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2018a) and D’Acunto, Hoang, and
Weber (2018b) show households on average behave in line with the predictions from the
consumption Euler equation in EU countries. They also use a salient policy, namely the
unexpected announcement of a future VAT increase, as a natural experiment to causally
identify the effect. Arioli et al. (2017) confirm these findings for quantitative inflation
expectations in Europe. Vellekoop and Wiederholt (2017) find the inflation expectations
of Dutch households are systematically related to the composition of households’ financial
portfolios. Using data from the same survey, Christelis et al. (2016) find trust in the
ECB lowers uncertainty about inflation expectations. Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and
Kumar (2018) advance this literature using experimental variation to study causally the
effect on inflation expectations on economic decisions. Malmendier and Nagel (2015)
show that personal experiences determine inflation expectations. D’Acunto, Malmendier,
Ospina, and Weber (2017) use unique survey data from the Nielsen homescan sample to
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show shopping experiences shape inflation expectations and determine the gender bias in
inflation expectations.
Our findings stress the importance of cognitive abilities to shape individual economic
decision-making. Papers that document the role of IQ in financial decision-making are
Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2011), who study the effect on stock market
participation, Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2012), who study the effect on
trading behavior, and Grinblatt, Ikäheimo, Keloharju, and Knüpfer (2015), who study
mutual fund choice. Agarwal and Mazumder (2013) relate cognitive abilities to suboptimal
use of credit cards and home-equity loan applications. More recently, Aghion et al. (2017)
use micro-level data on visiospatial IQ to study the effects of cognitive abilities, education,
and parental income on inventiveness. Dal Bo, Finan, Folke, Persson, and Rickne (2017)
relate IQ to the likelihood individuals enter political careers in Sweden. To the best of our
knowledge, D’Acunto et al. (2019) is the first paper that shows cognitive abilities matter
for the formation of economic expectations and choice. This paper is also the first one to
interpret cognitive abilities as a potential human friction to the transmission of economic
policy.
Increasing the transparency of economic policies and facilitating the public’s
understanding of policy targets are two key aims of the recent monetary-policy strategy
in the United States. The heterogeneity of our findings across cognitive abilities, as
well as the non-response of individuals with low cognitive abilities to policy changes,
suggests some individuals might not fully understand the aims of policy changes and
interventions. Cognitive abilities might therefore result in unintended consequences
such as the redistribution of resources from individuals with low IQ to individuals with
higher cognitive abilities, which calls for the design of salient policies and more targeted
communication strategies (see D’Acunto et al. (2018a) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and
Weber (2019)).
Our findings also inform the literature on the take-up of economic programs. In the
Great Recession, the US administration initiated programs for underwater homeowners
to refinance their mortgages, but the take-up rates were surprisingly low. Agarwal et al.
(2017) study the effects and take-up rates of the 2009 Home Affordable Modification
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Program, which provided intermediaries with sizable financial incentives to renegotiate
mortgages. They find a take-up rate of just one-third of the overall target population of
indebted US households. Moreover, Keys et al. (2016) show 20% of households that are
unlikely to be constrained fail to refinance their mortgages when interest rates decline.
Our findings suggest low cognitive abilities might help explain the limited effectiveness of
these policies.
Our paper is also inspired by a recent literature on the forward guidance puzzle
(see Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2015)) – the fact that forward guidance
is not as effective empirically as representative-agent models imply. Deviations from
the representative-agent framework could possibly explain the limited effectiveness.
Borrowing constraints paired with uninsurable income shocks and asset holdings of
different liquidity limit the scope of forward guidance and intertemporal substitution more
generally (see McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016), Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner
(2014), and Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018)). A recent theoretical literature explores
deviations from rational expectations in this context. Farhi and Werning (2017) extend the
standard New Keynesian model and allow for incomplete markets with uninsurable income
shocks and bounded rationality in the form of level-k thinking. These two extensions can
limit the power of monetary policy, especially at long horizons. Along similar lines,
Woodford (2018) shows decision-makers that only optimize for a limited number of
periods ahead can reduce the effectiveness of forward guidance. Gabaix (2018) develops
a behavioral New Keynesian model in which a subset of agents is myopic, which mutes
the power of forward guidance. Other recent theoretical models with level-k thinking are
Garcia-Schmidt and Woodford (2019), who show that interest-rate commitments do not
need to be deflationary in a liquidity trap, and Iovino and Sergeyev (2018)), who document
that balance-sheet policies by central banks might be effective because of level-k thinking.
We contribute to this literature by showing empirically that cognitive abilities help explain
why large parts of the population might not adjust their consumption plans in response to




Our analysis uses three micro data sets that include individual-level information on
macroeconomic expectations, consumption and borrowing plans, and cognitive abilities,
as well as administrative information on household-level income, debt, and interest rates.
A. Expectations, Spending, and Borrowing Plans
Our main source of information on individual-level macroeconomic expectations and
consumption and borrowing propensities is the confidential micro data underlying the
Consumer Climate Survey of Statistics Finland. Statistics Finland conducts the survey
on behalf of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European
Commission as part of the European Commissions’ harmonized consumer survey program.
Every month, they ask a representative repeated cross section of approximately 1,500
Finnish individuals questions about general and personal economic conditions, inflation
expectations, and willingness to spend on consumption goods. Statistics Finland also
collects additional information through supplementary questions about households’ plans
to save and borrow.
The samples are drawn from the total population of 4.4 million individuals and 2.6
million households residing in Finland. The survey is run through phone interviews. In
advance of the phone interview, Statistics Finland notifies all target individuals with a
letter that contains information about the contents and logistics of the survey.
We obtained access to the micro data underlying the survey for the period starting in
January 2001 and ending in March 2015. Our sample period includes large time variation
in macroeconomic fundamentals as well as large variation policy rates of the ECB, which
we exploit in the second part of our analysis.
We use the answers to the following three questions in the survey to construct the
variables capturing spending plans and inflation expectations and perceptions:
Question 6 By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer
prices will develop in the next 12 months?
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Individuals can answer, “Prices will increase more rapidly,” “Prices will increase at the
same rate,” “Prices will increase at a slower rate,” “Prices will stay about the same,” or
“Prices will fall.” We create a dummy variable that equals 1 when households answered,
“Prices will increase more rapidly,” to get a measure of higher expected inflation.7
Households’ inflation expectations are highly correlated with their perception of past
inflation (see Jonung (1981)). We also use survey question 4 in our baseline analysis to
disentangle the effects of inflation expectations from inflation perceptions:
Question 4 How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12
months?
Individuals can answer, “Prices have risen a lot,” “Prices have risen moderately,” “Prices
have risen slightly,” “Prices have stayed about the same,” or “Prices have fallen.”8
To study the association between inflation expectations and spending propensities,
we use the answer to the following question:
Question 10 In view of the general economic situation in Finland, do you think that
now it is the right moment for people to make major purchases such as
furniture, electrical/ electronic devices, etc.?
Households can answer, “It is neither the right moment nor the wrong moment,” “No, it
is not the right moment now,” or “Yes, it is the right moment now.”9
We use the answers to the following question to study the propensity to take out
loans in response to changes in nominal intererst rates:
Question 22 In view of the general economic situation in Finland, do you think that
at the moment ...
Households can answer, “It is a very bad time to borrow,” “It is a pretty bad time to
borrow,” “It is a pretty good time to borrow,” or “It is a very good time to borrow.”10
7The question corresponds to question 6 in the harmonized EC survey.
8The question corresponds to question 5 in the harmonized EC survey.
9The question corresponds to question 8 in the harmonized EC survey.
10The question is not part of the harmonized EC survey.
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In addition, we use questions regarding expectations about general macroeconomic
variables, personal income, and a rich set of socio-demographics from the Statistics
Finland survey, which include gender, age, marital status, household size, income,
employment status, number of children, region of residence, and education levels.
B. Cognitive Abilities Data
Finland has general conscription for men, which means that all Finnish men between the
ages of 18 and 60 are liable for military or non-military service. The share of men who
do non-military service is only about 3% of all men who start military service.11 Within
the first weeks of the mandatory military service, Finnish men typically around the age
of 19-20 have to participate in a series of tests. The FDF administers these tests and
uses the results to select candidates for possible officer training. Because ranking well
in the IQ test provides a set of advantages in terms of quality of training and access to
elite social networks, men have an incentive to perform as well as possible on the test
(Grinblatt et al. (2011)).
The test consists of 120 questions that attempt to test cognitive abilities in three
areas – visuospatial, mathematical, and verbal cognitive abilities. The FAF aggregates
those scores into a composite measure of cognitive abilities, which we label collectively
as IQ. The FAF standardizes IQ to follow a stanine distribution year by year. Stanine
(STAndard NINE) is a method of scaling test scores on a 9-point standard scale with a
mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 2. The respondents in the lowest 4% of test scores
are at least 1.75 standard deviations from the mean and are assigned a standardized IQ
of 1 and the 4% with the highest test scores are assigned a standardized IQ of 9. We have
test results for all participants from January 1, 1982 until December 31, 2001.
Finland is a homogeneous country in terms of cultural background and opportunities.
Access to education, including college education, is virtually for free. The country is also
racially homogeneous (Grinblatt et al. (2011)). These features make the Finnish setting
a desirable laboratory because our measures of IQ are unlikely to proxy for differences
in cultural or environmental factors individuals could manipulate, but are more likely to
11Please see https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/conscription for these and additional details.
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reflect differences in innate abilities across individuals.
C. Income and Debt Data from Registries
We also have access to administrative income and debt data for all Finnish full-time
residents at the end of each calendar year through Statistics Finland. The data
contain information on individuals’ labor and business incomes, received and paid income
transfers, as well as overall household liabilities. The information is collected from
underlying sources across various agencies (Tax Administration, National Institute for
Health and Welfare, Statistics Finland, Kela), administrative registers, and statistical
repositories.
D. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the main variables in our analysis. The
median income is EUR 21,000 and the median respondent is 30 years old. 61% of
respondents are single, 6% are unemployed, 78% have children, 34% have a college degree,
about a third lives in urban areas, and 28% live in Helsinki. 51% of respondents think
it is a good time to buy durables, 20% think it is a bad time, and the other respondents
think it is neither a good nor a bad time.
Table 2 reports the distribution of normalized IQ in Panel A, the average household
leverage ratio by IQ bins in Panel B, and the share of income in total income that accrues
to the individual IQ bins in Panel C. Panel B shows little variation in household leverage
ratios by IQ. Specifically, low-IQ men have a ratio of total debt to taxable income of 82%,
which is slightly higher than the ratio for all bins up to a normalized IQ of 7. High-IQ
men, instead, have a minimally higher leverage ratio of 0.93. In the bottom panel, we see
the share of income that accrues to the individual bins. Later in our empirical analysis,
we will often split the sample into low and high IQ, with the latter defined as having
a normalized IQ of 6 or higher. Note this implies low-IQ men make up 49.2% of total
income and are therefore a large share of aggregate income in the economy.
D’Acunto et al. (2019) show the measure of cognitive abilities has a correlation
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of only 0.15 with income and that IQ and forecast errors for inflation are negatively
correlated. Variation in observables such as income or education does not drive the
correlation between IQ and inflation expectations.
III Inflation Expectations, IQ, and Consumption
Expenditure
Most existing models studying fiscal and monetary policies assume a representative agent
that has all available information, forms expectations rationally, and fully optimizes.
The consumption Euler equation is at the core of all modern dynamic models in macro
and finance and predicts a positive association between consumption plans and inflation
expectations. This association means if the agent expects higher inflation, he should
substitute intertemporally and consume more now rather than later. In the textbook New
Keynesian model, monetary policy affects real outcomes purely through this intertemporal
substitution channel. Moreover, unconventional monetary-policy measures, such as
forward guidance, as well as unconventional fiscal policies also aim to increase households’
inflation expectations and stimulate consumption through intertemporal substitution (see
Kaplan et al. (2018) and D’Acunto et al. (2018a)). Hence, several types of policies rely
on intertemporal substitution.
Our baseline analysis focuses on this key building block – the consumption Euler
equation – that is instrumental to testing whether limited cognitive abilities hinder the
transmission of economic policies. The debate on whether individuals update their
consumption plans with their inflation expectations is still ongoing. Bachmann et al.
(2015) start this literature using microdata from the Michigan Survey of Consumers and
find no association between consumption plans and inflation expectations, whereas Crump
et al. (2018) find a positive association using data from the New York Fed Survey of
Consumers.
We aim to test whether low-IQ and high-IQ men differ in the extent to which they
update their consumption plans to changing inflation expectations. A crucial question
is whether such differences underline any heterogeneity in consumption responses to
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changing inflation expectations. This step is necessary for cognitive abilities to have
a role in individuals’ responsiveness to economic and monetary-policy interventions based
on intertemporal substitution.
A. Empirical Model
A common concern with survey-based measures of numerical inflation expectations is
that households often report implausibly high levels of expected inflation. Moreover,
many individuals report expected inflation rates as multiples of 5 or other round values,
and a general upward bias exists (see, e.g., Binder (2015) and D’Acunto et al. (2019)).
To avoid all the issues arising when using numerical inflation forecasts (see D’Acunto,
Hoang, and Weber (2018a) for a detailed discussion), we construct a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the respondent expects a higher inflation rate in the following 12 months,
compared to the prevailing inflation rate over the past 12 months, and zero otherwise.
D’Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2018a) show this measure tracks closely ex-post realized
inflation across several samples in different countries and different time periods. A
rationale for why this qualitative measure might track ex-post realized inflation more
closely than quantitative measures is that respondents might have a clear idea of the
directional changes in inflation they perceive and expect, but might be uninformed about
the level of inflation prevailing at the time they are interviewed.
Our first outcome variable of interest, households’ readiness to purchase durable
goods, derives from discrete, non-ordered choices in a survey. We therefore model the
response probabilities in a multinomial-logit setting.
We assume the answer to the question on the readiness to spend is a random variable
representing the underlying population. The random variable may take three values,
y ∈ {0, 1, 2}: 0 denotes it is neither a good nor a bad time to purchase durable goods,
1 denotes it is a bad time to purchase durable goods, and 2 denotes it is a good time to
purchase durable goods.
We define the response probabilities as P (y = t|X), where t = 0, 1, 2, and X is an
N × K vector where N is the number of survey participants. The first element of X
is a unit vector, and the other K − 1 columns represent a rich set of household-level
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observables, including demographics and expectations.
We assume the distribution of the response probabilities is







for t = 1, 2, and βt is a K × 1 vector of coefficients. The response probability for the case
y = 0 is determined, because the three probabilities must sum to unity.
We estimate the model via maximum likelihood to obtain the vector βt of coefficients
for t = 1, 2, and set the category y = 0 as the baseline response. We compute the marginal
effects of changes in the covariates on the probability that households choose any of three
answers in the survey, and report them in the tables.
B. Empirical Results: Baseline
Given the ongoing debate on the association between consumption plans and inflation
expectations (Bachmann et al. (2015), Crump et al. (2018)), we first estimate the
relationship between inflation expectations and readiness to purchase durable goods in
the overall EU survey sample of men and women.
If the Euler-equation logic holds, we should observe a positive association between
individuals’ inflation expectations and their readiness to purchase durable goods. Table
3 reports the average marginal effects computed from the multinomial logit regressions
of whether it is a good time to purchase durable goods on the dummy that equals 1
if the respondent thinks inflation will be higher in the following 12 months than it was
in the previous 12 months. We cluster standard errors at the quarter level to allow
for correlation of unknown form in the residuals across contiguous months. We always
condition on perceptions of past inflation because they shape households’ expectations
about future inflation (Jonung (1981)).12 We see in column (1) that individuals who
expect inflation to increase are on average 2.1% more likely to answer it is a good time
to buy durables compared to individuals who expect constant or decreasing inflation.
Of course, large differences exist in households’ purchasing propensities, which vary
12All results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar without conditioning on past inflation.
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systematically by demographic characteristics (see, e.g., Attanasio and Weber (1993)).
Household and individual characteristics that determine both purchasing propensities
and inflation expectations might be systematically related, and hence controlling for
the observed heterogeneity across individuals is important to verify the association we
document is not spurious. In column (2) of Table 3, we add a rich set of demographics
including age, age2, a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent is single and 0 otherwise, log
of income, a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent has a college degree and 0 otherwise,
an unemployment dummy, a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent has at least one child
and 0 otherwise, a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in a urban area and 0
otherwise, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki and 0 otherwise.
The baseline positive association between inflation expectations and readiness to purchase
durable goods is largely unchanged.
Having established that the baseline association between inflation expectations and
readiness to consume is positive for the average individual in the full sample of men and
women as the consumption Euler equation predicts, we move on to consider the subset
of male respondents for whom we observe cognitive abilities. This subsample amounts to
about 17% of the overall sample. When we repeat the specification of column (2) within
this restricted subsample, we find a positive marginal effect of inflation expectations on
consumption propensities, though is not statistically significant.
We find different results across sample splits on the association between inflation
expectations and purchasing plans, which is reminiscent of the conflicting evidence
for the US which we discussed above. But the nonresult on the association between
inflation expectations and purchasing propensities we observe for the subsample of
men might camouflage large heterogeneity on how different individuals respond in their
consumption plans to inflation expectations. For instance, low-cognitive-ability men might
not understand they should increase consumption when expecting higher inflation, ceteris
paribus.
To understand whether cognitive abilities might be relevant to explaining if
individuals’ consumption propensities react to changes in inflation expectations, we split
the whole sample into men with an IQ above 5 and other men. In columns (4) and (5)
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of Table 3, we repeat the analysis of column (3) separately for each of the two groups.
Column (4) shows that in the subsample with high cognitive abilities, men are 3.6% more
likely than other men with high IQ to say it is a good time to purchase durables when they
expect inflation to increase. This result is consistent with the conjecture that high-IQ men
understand intertemporal substitution as well as the consumption-Euler-equation logic,
and hence their consumption plans react to inflation expectations.
When we move on to consider men with lower IQs (column (5)), we do find a negative
but statistically insignificant marginal effect of inflation expectations on consumption
propensities. Note that a statistical-power issue can barely explain this lack of reaction
of the consumption plans of low-IQ men to inflation expectations, because the size of the
samples in column (4) and column (5) are almost identical.
Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that men with high cognitive abilities, but not
other men, adjust their consumption plans in response to inflation expectations in line
with the consumption Euler equation.
C. Financial Constraints and Individual-level Shocks
Binding financial constraints are a compelling alternative interpretation of our results.
If low-IQ men are systematically more likely to be financially constrained than high-IQ
men, low-IQ men’s consumption plans might be insensitive to inflation expectations not
because they do not understand intertemporal substitution, but because they cannot
easily substitute their consumption expenditure intertemporally. To assess the relevance
of this alternative interpretation, we repeat our baseline analysis, limiting the sample
to respondents who are unlikely to be financially constrained. To proxy for the lack of
financial constraints, we consider subsamples of respondents whose income is in the upper
part of the income distribution.
Table 4 reports the marginal effects of expecting higher inflation on the willingness
to purchase durable goods for respondents whose income is above the median income of
men with IQ data (columns (2) and (3)) and whose income is above the 25th percentile
(columns (4) and (5)). In both cases, we replicate the baseline positive association between
inflation expectations and readiness to spend on durable goods for high-IQ men. To the
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contrary, the consumption plans of low-IQ men appear to be insensitive to changes in
inflation expectations even for those men who are unlikely to be financially constrained.
Another relevant concern is that income expectations might explain our baseline
results, which could happen for several reasons. First, low-IQ men might have more
negative expectations regarding other dimensions of their future personal outlook and/
-or macroeconomic variables, which might mute their willingness to adjust future
consumption plans in response to inflation expectations (Das, Kuhnen, and Nagel (2018)).
For instance, low-IQ men who expect higher inflation might also be more likely than
high-IQ men to expect a job loss over the following 12 months. In this case, a negative
expected income shock might counteract the effect of higher inflation expectations on
consumption plans. Second, high-IQ men might adjust their consumption plans according
to their inflation expectations not because they have a Euler equation in mind, but
because they also expect higher income following an individual Phillips-curve logic. Third,
Kaplan et al. (2018) show in heterogeneous-agent models with uninsurable income shocks
and assets of different liquidity that conventional monetary policy affects consumption
decisions mainly through changes in income, because of indirect effects on labor demand.
To assess the relevance of these channels different from intertemporal substitution,
we exploit the richness of our expectations data. The survey asks about individuals’
expectations regarding any changes in their income over the following 12 months, which
should capture any potential household-level or macro-level shocks that are likely to
produce income effects at the household level.
Table 5 replicates our baseline analysis using individual income expectations. In
columns (2)-(3) of Table 5, we focus only on respondents who expect their income to
increase over the following 12 months. Within this group, the consumption plans of
high-IQ men react to inflation expectations, whereas the consumption plans of low-IQ
men are insensitive to inflation expectations – if anything, the statistically insignificant
association is negative. This result is direct evidence that even low-IQ men who do not
expect any negative income shocks during the following 12 months do not adjust their
consumption plans in response to inflation expectations. In columns (4)-(5) of Table 5,
we move on to consider only respondents who expect their household income to stay the
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same or decrease over the following 12 months. Again, we detect the same patterns as in
the baseline analysis, whereby high-IQ men adjust their consumption plans in response
to inflation expectations, whereas the consumption plans of low-IQ men are insensitive to
inflation expectations.
The results for high-IQ men suggest the consumer Euler equation plausibly explains
our baseline results, whereas income effects based on a Phillips-curve logic or indirect
effects of monetary policy are an unlikely explanation. Indirect effects of monetary policy
in a heterogeneous-agent framework could still stimulate future consumption expenditure
through higher realized labor income even for low-IQ men, but this policy could not be
used as a tool to increase aggregate demand in the short run.
IV Interest-Rate Transmission to Loans
Low-IQ men do not seem to adjust their consumption plans in response to inflation
expectations, which makes it unlikely that policies that purely rely on generating inflation
expectations reach this part of the population and can directly stimulate households’
current consumption (Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber (2019)).
Another channel through which policy could affect individual behavior is a
bank-lending channel; as the introductory quote by president Draghi highlights,
conventional monetary policy uses short-term interest rates in an attempt to stabilize
household consumption and investment in durable goods. We now study the propensity
to take out loans over time – which we observe in the EU survey – in response to changes
in nominal interest rates by cognitive abilities as well as total changes in household debt
over time using administrative data.
The time period our survey covers includes a full cycle of decrease and increase in
short-term nominal interest rates by the ECB from 2001 until 2006. Central banks often
lower nominal interest rates during crises to stimulate consumption through loans. At
the same time, central banks might increase nominal interest rates at times of sustained
growth and inflationary pressure to avoid overheating, again through lower credit.
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Panel A of Figure 2 shows the cycle in ECB policy rates we consider.13 On May
31, 2001, the ECB lowered its deposit facility rate from 3.75% to 3.50% (right y-axis)
and continued lowering the rate until it reached a trough of 1.00% on June 30, 2003.
Recessionary pressure in France and Germany mainly drove the cuts in nominal rates. In
times of low interest rates, financing conditions become more favorable and individuals
have an incentive to borrow more. In our setting, we can control directly for individual
expectations regarding future income and employment status, which absorbs the effects
of potentially concurrent recessionary pressures on Finnish households’ willingness to
borrow. Panel A of Figure 2 further documents that the ECB kept the deposit facility
rate stable from June 30, 2003, until June 30, 2005, when the ECB started to tighten
monetary policy and increased rates throughout 2006.
We first focus on survey responses, which allow us to study the demand-side for
credit and to abstract from possible financial constraints. The question reads, “If you
think about the general economic situation in Finland, then do you think that at this
time it is ...” and individuals can answer that now is a “very good time to borrow” (4),
a “pretty good time to borrow” (3), a “pretty bad time to borrow” (2), or a “really bad
time to borrow” (1). Below, we will also directly study actual changes in household debt
over time, which could be influenced by changes in credit supply and financial constraints.
Comparing Panels B and C of Figure 2, we see that the average propensity to take
out loans is about 2.5 for both groups of men at the beginning of the period. During the
period 2001-2003, while the ECB decreases short-term rates, high-IQ men increase their
propensity to borrow, with a peak at 3.1 exactly when the facility rate reaches its lowest
point for the 6-year period we consider. During the same period, low-IQ men’s propensity
to borrow increases only slightly, peaking at 2.8 in January 2003. Overall, the increase
in the propensity of high-IQ men to borrow (0.6) is 100% higher than the increase in the
propensity of low-IQ men to take out loans (0.3).
Men with low cognitive abilities might not increase their propensity to borrow,
because of financial constraints instead of a lack of forward-looking behavior. The wording
of the question makes it unlikely financial constraints explain the lower responsiveness of
13The figure plots the beginning of the quarter deposit facility rate. Other short-term policy rates such
as the rate on the main refinancing operations move in parallel to the deposit facility rate.
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low-IQ men. The increase in the deposit facility rate starting on June 30, 2005, allows us
to rule out directly financial constraints, because financial constraints can only limit the
uptake of credit but not the reduction of credit following an increase in rates.
We see in Panel C of Figure 2 that high-IQ men reduce their propensity to borrow
from 3.1 at the end of June 2005 to 2.6 in the third quarter of 2006. By contrast, low-IQ
men do not change their propensity to borrow over the same period, despite the higher
nominal interest rates.
These results point to a difference in the sensitivity of the propensity to borrow to
changes in nominal interest rates across men with different levels of cognitive abilities.
High-IQ men react to changes in nominal interest rates more than low-IQ men. Measures
of monetary policy aimed at affecting the real economy through household borrowing
might thus be less effective than representative-agent models predict, because a significant
fraction of individuals – those with lower cognitive abilities – might not react to changing
rates.
Our results so far did not absorb systematic heterogeneity across low-IQ and high-IQ
men other than cognitive abilities nor assess the statistical significance of the differences
in the reaction to changing nominal interest rates. We thus perform the analysis in a
multivariate setting. We report the marginal effects for estimating specifications of the
following type:
Loani,t = α + βIQi,t × Postt + γPostt + ζIQi,t +X ′i.tδ + ηt + εi,t, (2)
where Loani,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if respondent i in month t says it was a
very good or pretty good time to take out a loan, and zero otherwise; IQi,t is a dummy
variable that equals 1 when the standardized IQ score of individual i is 6 or above; Postt
is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months after the ECB decreased or increased the
facility rate, and zero in the months before the changes; and X is a vector of individual
level controls from above. We estimate this specification with a linear probability model
(OLS) as well as using non-linear estimators.
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results for estimating equation (2) for the period of
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January 2001 to June 2003, during which the ECB cut the deposit facility rate. The Post
dummy takes on the value of 1 starting in June 2001. Whether we study the raw data
across all estimation methods (columns (1)-(3)) or absorb demographic characteristics
(columns (4)-(6)), we find that (i) on average, all respondents are more likely to think it
is a good time to borrow after the cut in interest rates, but (ii) the propensity to borrow
increases significantly more for high-IQ men than for low-IQ men. High-IQ men increase
their propensity to take out loans by 100% and up to 150% more than low-IQ men, as can
be seen by comparing the estimated coefficients β̂ to the estimated coefficients γ̂ across
all specifications.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results for estimating equation (2) for the period
July 2003 to December 2006, during which the ECB increased the facility rate. In this
test, the Post dummy takes on the value of 1 starting in January 2006. Consistent with
the conjecture that high-IQ men react more to changes in policy rates, the estimated
coefficients β̂ are negative and statistically different from zero; that is, high-IQ men are
less likely than low-IQ men to claim it is a good time to take out a loan once nominal
interest rates increase. Once we control for demographic heterogeneity, high-IQ men are
about 3 times less likely to claim it is a good time to take out a loan compared to low-IQ
men and compared to the period before the interest-rate increase.
The differential sensitivity in the propensity to take out loans to changes in nominal
interest rates for men with high and low cognitive abilities both when interest rates
decrease and when interest rates increase makes financial constraints an unlikely driver
of these results.
Another explanation could be low-IQ men might be shut off from financial markets
and not care about changes in interest rates. But Panel B of Table 2 shows total debt
to taxable income is almost constant across the IQ distribution. Note also the survey
question asks respondents whether it is a good time to take out a loan in general, and not
whether it is a good time for their own households. Nevertheless, in the Online Appendix,
we address these concerns directly by estimating equation (2) separately for men in the
top fraction of the distribution by income, which includes households that are less likely
to face financial constraints. The results of this robustness test, which we report in Table
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A.1 of the Online Appendix, corroborate the view that differences in the reaction to
policy changes across levels of cognitive abilities might be driven by a different ability to
understand economic incentives between high-IQ men and low-IQ men.
Moreover, a differential pass-through of policy rates to individual borrowing rates
for low- and high-IQ men might explain our findings. For example, banks might
systematically change interest rates more slowly for men with low cognitive abilities than
for men with high cognitive abilities in response to changes in policy rates. This differential
pass-through is an unlikely explanation because 95% of all mortgages in Finland are
adjustable-rate mortgages with a spread on the 12-month EURIBOR, and mortgages
represented 74% of all consumer debt at the end of 2014.
Finally, so far we have studied exclusively the association between inflation
expectations, interest rates, and survey decisions. Even though low-IQ men might not
adjust their propensities to take out loans to changes in interest rates, it could still be
the case high- and low-IQ men might adjust their actual decisions in similar ways for
several reasons: (i) they might learn from family, neighbours, co-workers, or friends; (ii)
supply-side forces might tell low-IQ men to adjust their decisions; for example, mortgage
bankers might call these men and tell them now is a good time to take out loans given
rates are low; (iii) they might be aware of their inability to optimize and rely on advice
in general.
One drawback of using observational data is that those do not only capture
individuals’ propensity to borrow but also any unobservable dimension that drives their
actual ability to borrow, such as credit constraints.
To test whether we observe differences in the behavior between low- and high-IQ men
also in actual choices, we use registry data from Statistics Finland. We observe for each
individual at an annual frequency the amount of total debt outstanding for tax purposes.
We then calculate the annual change in total debt and regress it on the change in the
deposit facility rate, estimating the following specification:
∆Debti,t = α + βIQi,t ×∆Ratest + ζIQi,t +X ′i.tδ + ηt + εi,t,
24
where ∆Debti,t is the annual change in total debt of respondent i; ∆Ratest is the annual
change in the ECB deposit facility rate; IQi,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 when
the standardized IQ score of individual i is 6 or above; and X is a vector of individual
level controls. The sample period is 2001 to 2011 when the deposit facility rate reaches
the effective lower bound.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 7 report the results for the sample from 2001 until
2011 when the change in the deposit facility rate reached 0. We see the estimate for the
interaction term is negative and marginally statistically significant when we average out
demographic controls. An increase in the deposit facility rate of 1% reduces the amount
of total debt by 57 Euros more for high-IQ men, which is about 3% of the average change
during our sample.
Of course, the recent Great Recession and European Sovereign Debt Crisis are major
macroeconomic events during this sample period and might affect the changes in debt.
Columns (3) and (4) report results for a sample ending in 2007. Again, we see high-IQ
men reduce their total debt more than low-IQ men. The estimate in column (4) when we
partial out demographics equals around 4% of the average change in our sample.
Overall, irrespective of studying survey responses or actual borrowing decisions, we
find high-IQ men are more responsive than low-IQ men to changes in nominal interest
rates.
V Channels
In the previous sections, we provided arguments for why channels such as households’
financial constraints or expectations about future economic conditions are unlikely to
explain our findings. In this section, we further investigate a set of channels that could
help explain why low-IQ men might be less responsive than high-IQ men to inflation
expectations.
First, low-IQ men might be less informed than high-IQ men about economic
fundamentals including the current state, potentially because gathering information about
macroeconomic variables is more cognitively costly to them (costly information-gathering
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channel). Therefore, low-IQ men could have miscalibrated perceptions about current
inflation resulting in miscalibrated beliefs about future macroeconomic variables. As long
as low-IQ men understand their expectations are biased, they would not rely on them
when forming purchasing plans. D’Acunto et al. (2019) provide evidence consistent with
the costly information-gathering channel.
To assess this channel directly, we exploit the fact that the survey asks households
directly about their perception of the current 12-month inflation rate. Based on this
question, we compute an inflation-perception error at the individual level as the difference
between the perceived inflation rate and the prevailing inflation rate.
We focus on a sample of men with perception errors below the median within each
month. These men represent individuals who are likely to be informed about the prevailing
inflation rate at the time of the interview, and due to the large sample size, they are
unlikely to be individuals who merely guessed the prevailing inflation rates while providing
values at random.
In column (1) of Table 8, we find high-IQ men within the group of men with low
perception errors for contemporaneous inflation display a large positive and significant
association between their inflation expectations and consumption propensities. The size of
this association is higher than the size of the baseline association we detected in Table 3. In
column (2) of Table 8, the point estimate is positive and economically non-negligible, but
we fail to detect a significant association between inflation expectations and consumption
propensities for low-IQ men with low perception errors for contemporaneous inflation.
The second channel we consider – costly expectations-formation channel – states
low-IQ men might be unable to think in probabilistic terms and about future states of
the world (McDowell and Jacobs (2017)). This channel could explain the non-response in
the Euler equations only if low-IQ men were sophisticated about their bias.
To assess the relevance of this channel, we exploit the fact the survey asks both
numerical and qualitative expectations about inflation and focus on a subsample of men
with forecast errors below the median forecast errors for inflation. We define forecast error
as the difference between the expected numerical inflation rate over the next 12 months of
individual i in months t and the ex-post realized inflation rate in 12 months. Intuitively,
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in this subsample, even low-IQ men are able to think probabilistically and to come up
with plausible assessments of future states of the world.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 show only high-IQ men increase their spending
propensities when they expect higher inflation. Low-IQ men are still unresponsive, both
economically and statistically, even if their expectations about future inflation are close
to the ex-post realization.
A third channel, which we label the lack-of-economic-reasoning channel, is low-IQ
men might not understand basic economic concepts such as intertemporal optimization.
This channel is potentially consistent with all the evidence in the paper and could also
rationalize other puzzles in the literature such as the excess sensitivity of consumption
to predictable income changes (see, e.g., Parker et al. (2013)). Ilut and Valchev (2017)
model agents with limited cognitive knowledge of the optimal action conditional on the
economic state and could provide a theoretical foundation for this channel.
A last point to consider is the fact that many economists discard data on household
inflation expectations because such data are noisy and sometimes extreme observations
occur, which economists take as a sign that those data are unreliable. We agree with the
notion that household-level inflation expectations are quite noisy, but disagree with the
prescription that because of this noise, economists and policymakers should discard data
on household expectations when conducting academic research or designing policies. The
very fact that many policies rely on households reacting to higher inflation expectations
by increasing their consumption propensities makes understanding which households have
plausible inflation expectations and which households understand the theoretical link
between inflation expectations and consumption propensities crucial for the effectiveness
of economic policies.
VI Conclusion
In a representative sample of Finnish men, we find that only men with high cognitive
abilities change consumption plans in line with the consumption Euler equation. High-IQ
men are also twice as responsive as low-IQ men in their propensity to borrow to interest
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rate changes, and their total debt balances from tax data are also more sensitive to changes
in interest rates. Short-term interest rates are the conventional monetary-policy tool of
central banks, and consumer credit is a central propagation mechanism of interest rates to
the real economy. Our findings suggest that cognitive abilities are a human friction that
can limit central banks’ ability to stabilize demand both in recessions and expansions.
This human friction might inform future theoretical and empirical advances in the recent
literature on heterogeneous agents in economics and finance.
The consumption Euler equation is at the core of all dynamic models in macroe-
conomics and finance. In representative-agent New Keynesian models, conventional and
unconventional fiscal policy, as well as monetary policy, typically operates through changes
in inflation expectations on households’ consumption decisions. The results in this paper
show many households might ignore these fundamental assumptions of macroeconomic
models and policymaking and therefore not react. Thus, policymakers should design
policies in a way that is salient and easy to understand for the whole population. An
example of such a salient type of policy is unconventional fiscal policy, such as the
pre-announcement of future value-added tax increases (e.g., see D’Acunto, Hoang, and
Weber (2018a)). Our results also provide empirical support for recent theoretical advances
that deviate from the rational-expectations paradigm, such as Farhi and Werning (2017),
Gabaix (2018), Woodford (2018), Garcia-Schmidt and Woodford (2019), and Iovino and
Sergeyev (2018).
Our findings also show that the common practice of focusing on financial markets in
monetary-policy communication might not be enough. Even if central banks are successful
in changing long-term rates by guiding financial markets regarding the future path of
short-term interest rates, if a substantial fraction of the population does not react to
these changes in rates, the policy might be ineffective. Future research should also study
which type of communication tools policymakers can use to reach the overall population
instead of only a small fraction of it. Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber (2019) show
solely relying on newpspapers and the media might not be sufficient in this respect and
that policymakers have to consider novel strategies to communicate with the public.
More broadly, combining economic policies with limited cognitive abilities is likely to
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result in redistributive effects from low-IQ individuals to high-IQ individuals, because only
high-IQ individuals adjust their behavior in response to changing economic fundamentals.
This redistribution could be interpreted as a form of undue discrimination of low-IQ
individuals on the part of policymakers to the extent that cognitive abilities are an innate
individual characteristic or are largely determined by early-life environmental factors
individuals can barely control. Future empirical and theoretical research should delve into
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Figure 2: ECB Deposit Facility Rate and Propensity to Borrow by IQ
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Panel A of this figure plots the beginning of the quarter European Central Bank Deposit Facility Rate from
quarter 1 2001 to quarter 4 of 2006. Panel B and Panel C of this figure plot the cross-sectional mean of
whether individuals think it is a good time to take out a loan in Finland by IQ levels. Individuals can answer
that now is a “very good time to borrow” (4), a “pretty good time to borrow” (3), a “pretty bad time to
borrow” (2), or a “really bad time to borrow” (1) to the question, “If you think about the general economic
situation in Finland, then do you think that at this time it is ...” High-IQ men are all men with the highest 3
scores of the 9-point distribution. Low-IQ men are all men with the lowest 3 scores of the 9-point distribution.
We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey
to measure the propensity to take out a loan. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance
exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score.
The sample period is January 2001 to December 2006.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables we use in the paper. We use the confidential micro data
underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. We measure
normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. The sample period is January 2001
to March 2015.
Inflation Inflation IQ
Statistic Perception Expectation Total Debt Dummy Age Income
Nobs 27,544 27,566 27,828 27,856 27,856 27,856
Mean 3.00 2.47 38,510 0 31 22,516
Std 4.63 3.76 53,734 0 7 14,247
p1 -5.00 -5.00 0 0 19 900
p10 0.00 0.00 0 0 21 6,800
p25 0.00 0.00 0 0 25 13,100
p50 2.00 2.00 14,400 0 30 21,000
p75 5.00 3.50 62,200 1 36 28,850
p90 7.00 5.00 102,200 1 40 38,200
p99 20.00 15.00 242,400 1 46 74,200
Single no 38.75% Urban no 64.59%
yes 61.25% yes 35.41%
Unemployed no 94.11% Helsinki no 72.28%
yes 5.89% yes 27.72%
Kids no 22.43% College no 66.06%
yes 77.57% yes 33.94%
Durables Good time 50.84% Loan Good time 70.71%
Neutral 28.69% Bad time 29.29%
Bad time 20.47%
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Table 2: IQ, Income, and Total Debt
This table reports the distribution of IQ in Panel A, the household leverage ratio in Panel B, and the share of
income in total income in Panel C. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all
men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Income and debt data
come from the registry of Statistics Finland. The sample period is January 2001 to March 2015.
Low IQ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 High IQ
Panel A. Distribution of Normalized IQ
Nobs 1,785 3,921 4,701 10,907 13,797 11,162 7,849 4,043 3,298
Panel B. Total Debt / Taxable Income by IQ
0.82 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.87 0.93
Panel C. Income Share by IQ
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Change in the Propensity to Borrow around Interest Rate Changes
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following specification:
Loani,t = α+ βIQDummyi × Postt + γPostt + ζIQDummyi +X ′i.tδ + εi,t,
where Loani,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respond answers it is a good time to take out a loan, and
zero otherwise; and Postt is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months in which the ECB changes the deposit
facility rate, and zero in the months before the change. We estimate this specification with a linear probability model
(OLS) as well as using non-linear estimators. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European
Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. We measure normalized IQ using data from
the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam
test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. IQ dummy
equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. Demographic controls are age, age2, sex, marital status, log of income,
employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals
1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. The sample period is January 2001 to December 2006.
OLS Probit Logit OLS Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Rate Cut: Jan 2001 – June 2003
IQ Dummy −0.0278 −0.0241 −0.0248 −0.0482 −0.0445 −0.0448
(0.0293) (0.0274) (0.0282) (0.0325) (0.0295) (0.0308)
Post 0.0618∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.0648∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗ 0.0619∗∗
(0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0225) (0.0251) (0.0258) (0.0263)
Post × IQ Dummy 0.0945∗∗∗ 0.0913∗∗∗ 0.0919∗∗∗ 0.0884∗∗ 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.0883∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0287) (0.0297) (0.0352) (0.0313) (0.0326)
Demographics X X X
R2 0.0121 0.0101 0.0101 0.0509 0.0463 0.0464
Nobs 5,850 5,850 5,850 4,070 4,070 4,070
Panel B. Rate Increase: July 2003 – December 2006
IQ Dummy 0.0789∗∗∗ 0.0811∗∗∗ 0.0806∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0411∗∗∗ 0.0407∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0128)
Post 0.0050 0.00464 0.00471 −0.0328∗∗ −0.0308∗∗ −0.0337∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0157)
Post × IQ Dummy −0.0753∗∗∗−0.0855∗∗∗−0.0833∗∗∗ −0.0823∗∗∗−0.0939∗∗∗−0.0948∗∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0233) (0.0226) (0.0218) (0.0262) (0.0256)
Demographics X X X
R2 0.007 0.0067 0.0067 0.0442 0.0465 0.0475
Nobs 8,601 8,601 8,601 5,937 5,937 5,937
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 7: Change in Total Outstanding Debt to Interest Rate Changes
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following specification:
∆debti,t = α+ βIQDummyi,t ×∆ratest + ζIQDummyi,t +X ′i.tδ + ηt + εi,t,
where ∆debti,t is the annual change in total debt of respondent i; ∆ratest is the annual change in the ECB deposit
facility rate; and X is a vector of individual-level controls including age, age2, sex, marital status, log of income,
employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals
1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. We use registry data from Statistics Finland to construct these variables. We
measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test
score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with
9 being the highest score. IQ dummy equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. The sample period is 2001 to 2011.
2001-2011 2001-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IQ Dummy × ∆ rates −51.41 −56.84∗ −121.73 ∗ ∗∗ −89.10 ∗ ∗
(33.23) (33.29) (41.58) (41.80)
IQ Dummy 13.78 78.40 45.74 59.21
(29.90) (31.32) (33.10) (35.83)
Demographics X X
Year FE X X X X
R2 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.009
Nobs 271,787 267,988 154,175 152,100
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table A.1: Change in the Propensity to Take out Loan to Rate changes:
unconstrained
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following specification:
Loani,t = α+ βIQDummyi × Postt + γPostt + ζIQDummyi +X ′i.tδ + εi,t,
where Loani,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respond answers it is a good time to take out a loan, and
zero otherwise; and Postt is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months in which the ECB changes the deposit
facility rate, and zero in the months before the change. We estimate this specification with a linear probability model
(OLS) as well as using non-linear estimators. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European
Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. We measure normalized IQ using data from
the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam
test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. IQ dummy
equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. Demographic controls are age, age2, sex, marital status, log of income,
employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals
1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. The sample period is January 2001 to December 2006.
OLS Probit Logit OLS Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Rate Cut: Jan 2001 – June 2003
IQ Dummy 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 −0.0361 −0.0339 −0.0342
(0.0319) (0.0284) (0.0299) (0.0335) (0.0299) (0.0315)
Post 0.1002∗∗∗ 0.0936∗∗∗ 0.0951∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.0708∗∗∗
(0.0238) (0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0257) (0.0265) (0.0271)
Post × IQ Dummy 0.0663∗ 0.0693∗∗ 0.0688∗∗ 0.0789∗∗ 0.0805∗∗ 0.0808∗∗
(0.0348) (0.0305) (0.0319) (0.0361) (0.0317) (0.0333)
Demographics X X X
R2 0.0179 0.0158 0.0158 0.0468 0.0439 0.0437
Nobs 4,422 4,422 4,422 3,804 3,804 3,804
Panel B. Rate Increase: July 2003 – December 2006
IQ Dummy 0.0676∗∗∗ 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0720∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0427∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Post −0.0269∗ −0.0247∗ −0.0252∗ −0.0396∗∗ −0.0369∗∗ −0.0398∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0160)
Post × IQ Dummy −0.0847∗∗∗−0.0997∗∗∗−0.0963∗∗∗ −0.0858∗∗∗−0.0987∗∗∗−0.0986∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0259) (0.0250) (0.0221) (0.0268) (0.0261)
Demographics X X X
R2 0.011 0.0115 0.0115 0.0433 0.0451 0.0459
Nobs 6,548 6,548 6,548 5,650 5,650 5,650
Statistics in parentheses
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